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Roberts to America: Trust us
By: William Yeomans and Herman Schwartz
January 24, 2012 10:26 PM EST

Chief Justice John Roberts’s response in his year-end report to the increasing controversy
over the ethics of Supreme Court justices served to drive home the need for the high court
to adopt reforms immediately.
Roberts rejects calls that the justices should be subject to the basic code of ethics that
governs all other federal judges and must provide some transparency to their recusal
decisions. His argument seems based on the proposition that the justices are good people
and able jurists — so they don’t have to be officially bound by a code or explain decisions
governing their conduct or recusal.
In Roberts’s view, these good jurists should not have to explain how their decisions
conform to the law. Yet the courts’ fundamental legitimacy rests on the notion that judges
apply the facts to the law impartially and explain what they have done in reasoned
opinions for all to read. Roberts’s position mocks that.
He acknowledges that justices are the only federal judges not bound by the Code of
Conduct, but he notes that they do consult the code “in assessing their legal obligations.”
They also consult other sources for guidance, Roberts adds, including “judicial opinions,
treatises, scholarly articles and disciplinary decisions” and may turn to the Supreme
Court’s legal office and the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Codes of Conduct.
Kudos to the chief for explaining that. But the problem is we members of the bar and the
American public at large, have no idea what or whom is consulted in any particular
instance — and we have no explanation of the results of all of that consultation. Instead,
we are supposed to trust that justices will get it right because, as Roberts says, they “are
jurists of exceptional integrity and experience.”
This may be true, but when, for example, justices decide legal matters, we insist they write
opinions explaining their reasoning — precisely because able jurists can disagree and
even get it wrong on occasion. Our check on the Supreme Court’s power is the
transparency provided by publicly announced opinions.
This same transparency is even more essential when justices apply the law to themselves.
As evident in this term, when the court will consider politically charged issues like the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, the power of states to regulate immigration and
Texas congressional redistricting, the court’s processes must be transparent. Only then
can we be certain that it’s adhering to the rule of law and not the justices’ political or policy
interests.
Roberts’s biggest problem is that it is not clear how some justices’ conduct squares with
the law. For example, we need a reasoned explanation — much as Justice Antonin Scalia
attempted to explain his duck hunting boondoggle with then-Vice President Dick Cheney
— of the propriety of the recent decision by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia to
headline a fundraiser for The Federalist Society, where law firms bought tables for
thousands of dollars. Some of these lawyers were participating in the health care litigation
the court agreed that day to hear.
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The Code of Conduct says that, with few exceptions “a judge should not personally
participate in fundraising activities, solicit funds for any organization or use or permit the
use of the prestige of judicial office for that purpose.” Yet Justice Samuel Alito headlined
fundraisers for the conservative American Spectator magazine. Did he go through all the
steps proscribed by the chief justice? If so, how did he conclude that this conduct, which
seems at odds with the code, was ethical? Many other examples abound — though
justices appear to feel no obligation to explain.
The chief justice’s resistance to accountability extends even to limitations on judicial
participation legislatively imposed by Congress. Roberts discusses only the general
requirement that “a judge shall recuse himself in any case in which the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.” He ignores specific provisions that apply to all federal
judicial officials — including Supreme Court justices.
Yet ever since our nation’s earliest days, Congress — continuing recusal requirements set
not only by English parliaments but as far back as the Code of Justinian — has required
all judges, including Supreme Court justices, to withdraw from any case in which they
have an interest or had early involvement with. This requirement has been extended to
include a variety of fiduciary and other relationships.
The most important recent expansion of congressional control was in 1974, after thenJustice William H. Rehnquist insisted on participating in a controversial case challenging
military surveillance of anti-Vietnam War public meetings. When Rehnquist served as
assistant attorney general, he had told Congress that this challenge lacked merit and
should be dismissed. As head of the Office of Legal Counsel, he had approved authorizing
the surveillance.
Rehnquist’s participation produced a 5-4 decision upholding the surveillance. Congress
promptly amended the law to bar any judicial officer, including a justice, who had taken a
position on a case in prior employment.
It is generally assumed today that a justice may not sit on a case about which he or she
had earlier expressed a view. Scalia, for example, recused himself from a case
challenging the reference to God in the pledge of allegiance after he had expressed
disdain for the plaintiff’s position in a speech.
Roberts’s discussion may also reflect the astonishing view in his annual report that
legislative limitations on a justice’s activities are unconstitutional. He notes, for example,
that “the court has never addressed whether Congress may impose [financial reporting
requirements and limitations on the receipt of gifts and outside earned income] on the
Supreme Court. The justices, nevertheless, comply with these provisions.” With respect to
“the limits of Congress’s power to require recusal,” he comments that this power has
“never been tested.”
But is there any serious doubt that Congress has the power to impose financial reporting
requirements? These requirements are imposed on all senior members of the
government, including members of Congress and executive branch officials. Surely, the
public has a right to know if a justice or his or her spouse is receiving large sums of money
or gifts from individuals or corporations with interests before the bench. And the disclosure
requirements must be mandatory and enforced.
Indeed, Thomas’s recent actions drive the point home. After reporting his wife’s income for
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many years, as required by law, Thomas suddenly stopped. His claim that he
misunderstood the reporting form seems nonsensical. The form did not change. Rather,
given that his wife was earning hundreds of thousands of dollars from The Heritage
Foundation, he appears to have simply stopped reporting. Similarly though, he has
reportedly accepted more gifts than any other justice, according to a 2004 article in The
Los Angeles Times. Thomas has not reported a single gift since the article appeared.
Roberts also raises the key problem created when a justice recuses him or herself: There
can be no substitute. This raises the possibility of an equally divided court. Apart from the
rarity of such a division — in the 26 cases that Justice Elena Kagan recused herself from
last term because of her solicitor general service, only two resulted in a divided court.
Moreover, despite Roberts’s concern, justices do recuse themselves voluntarily. They
don’t, however, explain why they won’t hear a case and even refuse to explain why they
won’t give their reasons.
Courts obviously need secrecy for their deliberations and decision making. But there can
be no harm in a justice explaining why he or she withdraws from a case or refuses to
withdraw. Neither the Supreme Court nor Rehnquist or Scalia was in any way
compromised by the explanations they offered for why they declined to withdraw from,
respectively, the Vietnam War surveillance case and the duck hunting case.
The Supreme Court’s fetish for secrecy denies the American people their right to know
whether the justices are doing their job as they should. No public servant — not even a
Supreme Court justice — is entitled to be that independent.
William Yeomans, an American University law professor, served as Sen. Ted Kennedy’s
chief counsel on the Judiciary Committee and as a Justice Department official. Herman
Schwartz is a constitutional law professor at the American University Washington College
of Law.
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